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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE, OF UT All

T. VAL CHRISTIANSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
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UT AH-IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY,
a corporation, and UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD, a
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT -RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING

POINT T
The Utah case of Soderberg v. Holt clearly holds that when
a grantor conveys real property by warranty deed, and an
encumbrance exists thereon such as an easement, not
involving a money charge upon the land, the statute of
limitations on grantee's cause of action for breach of the
covenant against encumbrances begins to run on the date
of the conveyance. The date the grantee learns of the
existence of the easement is immaterial.

The court, in scipport of its reversal of the Summary Judgment
granted in the above-entitled case by the District Court, stated in its
opinion that the issue of when Plaintiff-Appellant received notice of the
easement upon his property was a genuine issue regarding a material
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reevaluate this position on rehearing.

Defendant-Respondent does

not deny that there is a factual issue regarding when Plaintiff-Appellant
learned of the existence of the easement.

But Utah case law clearly

indicates that this issue is immaterial to the resolution of this action.
Even if Plaintiff-Appellant first learned of the easement in 1973, as he
contends, the statute of limitations for any breach of the covenant against
encumbrances resulting from the existence of the easement had already
expired many years earlier.
The Utah case of Soderberg v. Holt, 86 Utah 485, 46 P. 2d 428
(1935), conclusively supports Defendant-Respondent 1 s position on this
point.

This case was cited in Defendant-Respondent's Brief on Appeal

and its holding was thoroughly discussed on pages 11 through 14 of the
Brief.

The opinion of this court on appeal cites the Soderberg case on

another point, but it makes no reference to Soderberg's discussion of
when a cause of action accrues with respect to a breach of the covenant
against encumbrances.

The court's opinion in the present case states that

"the time the cause of action accrues therefore, is the time at which the
grantee first receives notice, either actual or constructive, of an
encumbrance against his property." No citations are given in support
of this statement.

Because this statement is contrary to the holding in

the Soderberg case, Defendant-Respondent submits that it would be
appropriate for this court to carefully review the Soderberg case, including
the discussion thereof in Defendant-Respondent's Brief on Appeal, and
reconsider its position on this point.

If the court chooses to maintain
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its present position and reverse the Soderberg case insofar as it conflicts
with the present opinion, that is a matter for the discretion of this court,
But if the court chooses to continue to follow the settled rules set forth
in the Soderberg case, it would appear that it should change its position
on this rehearing and hold in favor of Defendant-Respondent on this point.
The court in Soderberg held that in the case of encumbrances
"which were permanent and which were burdens upon the title, such as an
easement . . . , " a covenant against them was broken at once and finally
upon the date of the conveyance,

In such cases, the statute of limitations

for an action for breach of the covenant against encumbrances begins to
run upon the date of the conveyance.

In the present case, the conveyance

to Plaintiff-Appellant took place in 1945,

The encumbrance which existed

upon the land was an easement, and according to the express language of
the Soderberg case, the statute of limitations for a cause of action in the
Plaintiff-Appellant for breach of the covenant against encumbrances
expired in 1951.

Any claim Plaintiff-Appellant may have had for breach

of said covenant expired over twenty years before this action was filed.
The date the Plaintiff-Appellant first learned of the existence of the
easement is absolutely immaterial, and the fact that there is an issue
regarding that date has no effect upon the propriety of the Summary
Judgment rendered by the lower court.
POINT II
Even if the existence of the easement upon PlaintiffAppellant's property prevented him from selling the
property, Plaintiff-Appellant was never evicted,
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either actually or constructively, from the property
as defined in Utah law.
The opinion of this court in this action appears to indicate that
there is one other material issue of fact in this case, namely, whether
the Plaintiff-Appellant lost his property as a result of the existence of
the easement, or as a result of his own financial problems.

Defendant-

Respondent submits that even if the position asserted by Plaintiff-Appellant
were true, that is, that Plaintiff-Appellant was unable to sell or refinance
his property as a result of the existence of the easement, and that this
led to the foreclosure of the mortgage and the forced sale of the property,
Plaintiff-Appellant would still have no cause of action against DefendantRespondent for breach of either the covenant of warranty or the covenant
against encumbrances.

This is because the Plaintiff-Appellant was never

evicted from his property.
It is important to clarify the particular manner in which the

Plaintiff-Appellant lost his property.

First, it is clear that the Defendant-

Respondent U & I Sugar Company, Inc, never took any action to evict or
otherwise remove Plaintiff-Appellant from his property.

It is equally

clear that the Defendant-Respondent Union Pacific Railroad never took
any action to evict or otherwise remove Plaintiff-Appellant from the
property.

In fact, it is undisputed that the railroad never even threatened

to remove Plaintiff-Appellant from the property or to enforce its
easement,
The undisputed facts show that the parties that foreclosed upon
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and sold Plaintiff-Appellant's property were none other than his own
mortgagees, Dean and Vilate Terry.

Plaintiff-Appellant had voluntarily

given them a mortgage on his property in Hl65.

It is undisputed that the

foreclosure action was taken against the property because PlaintiffAppellant failed to make the required mortgage payments.

The existence

of the easement had nothing whatever to do with Plaintiff-Appellant
borrowing money from the Terrys twenty years after he purchased the
property, giving them a mortgage on the property, and thereafter failing
to make the required payments.

It was the failure to make mortgage

payments as required, and not the existence of the easement, that led to
the foreclosure action and subsequent loss of the property.

Plaintiff-

Appellant was never evicted from the property.
It was the acts of the Plaintiff-Appellant, and not any act of

Defendant-Respondent, that caused Plaintiff-Appellant to lose his property.
Certainly he should not be permitted to prevail against Defendant-Responde"'
when the loss of the property was a consequence of his own actions and not
a result of the existence of any easement.

When Defendant-Respondent

gave Plaintiff-Appellant the warranty deed to the property, it did not
warrant that Plaintiff-Appellant would never lose the property as a result
of his failure to make future mortgage payments on it.
to place such a burden on a grantor.

It would be unjust

The grantor should not be

responsible for the loss of property resulting from grantee's own acts
which take place long after the conveyance of the property.
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In East Canyon Land & Stock Company v. Davis and Weber
Counties Canal Company,

65 utah 560, 238 P. 280 (1925), the utah

Supreme Court held that "where one seeks to recover for a breach of
the covenants of warranty of title, he must allege an eviction by one having
paramount or better title." This view is supported in Van Cott v. Jacklin,
63 Utah 412, 226 P. 460 (1924).

The covenant of warranty of title is

usually called into play when a grantor conveys property in which a prior
grantor still claims an interest.

When the prior grantor evicts the grantee

from the property as a result of his having paramount title thereto, the
grantee has a claim against his grantor for breach of the covenant of
warranty.

In the present case, from Plaintiff-Appellant's contention, the

railroad had an easement of record across the property conveyed to
Plaintiff-Appellant, but the railroad never sought to enforce its easement.
Instead, the Plaintiff-Appellant later lost the property as a result of the
foreclosure of a mortgage he entered into over twenty years after the
conveyance to him, not as the result of an eviction.

Defendant-Respondent

should not be responsible for the loss of the property.
"Eviction," to constitute a breach of the covenant of warranty, must
be "by one having an adverse or paramount title which existed when the
covenant was made." Wilder v. Wilhite, 190 Kan. 564, 376 P. 2d 797
(1962).

The mortgage to the Terrys did not exist when the covenant was

made in this case.

No eviction ever took place,

The loss of property in

a foreclosure action, with a subsequent failure to redeem, is not an
eviction.

The factual question of whether or not the existence of the
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easement prevented Plaintiff-Appellant from selling or refinancing
his property is completely immaterial, because the covenants of title
do not warrant that a party will be able to sell or refinance his property,
They only provide that he will never be evicted from it,

The undisputed

facts, viewed in light of the case law, show that Plaintiff-Appellant
was never evicted from the property.

The Summary Judgment of the

District Court was proper.

CONCLUSION
Defendant-Respondent respectfully submits that the two issues of
fact cited in the opinion of this court in support of its reversal are not
material to a determination of the case.

Since the statute of limitations

for breach of the covenant against encumbrances in the case of easements
begins to run on the date of the conveyance, the date on which the grantee
learns of the existence of the easement is immaterial.

Furthermore,

since the Plaintiff-Appellant was never evicted from his property, but
was rather foreclosed upon by one holding a mortgage he voluntarily
granted over twenty years after the conveyance, the issue of whether the
existence of the easement prevented Plaintiff-Appellant from selling or
refinancing his property is immaterial.

At most, the existence of the

easement prevented such sale or refinancing of the property, but even if
this did occur, it was no breach of the covenants of title.

Defendant-

Respondent had nothing to do with the granting or paying of the mortgage,
and should not be responsible for the loss of the property upon its
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foreclosure.
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment was properly granted
by the District Court, and upon rehearing, this court should affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
DATED

this--'~-- day of February, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & CONDIE

By
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Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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